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The Iraqi Constitution: Upholding
Principles of Democracy While
Struggling to Curtail the Dangers of
an Islamic Theocracy
The [Iraqi] constitution is undemocratic and out of step
with human rights norms.
David Phillips1
This innovative formulation [of the Iraqi constitution]
goes far toward establishing Islamic and democratic
values on equal footing.
Noah Feldman

2

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Iraq, plagued in the past by oppression,
dictatorship, war, ethnic cleansing and discrimination, 3 captivated
See Constitution Process Risks a Civil War, Council on FOREIGN
Aug.
26,
2005,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8766/
constitution-process-risks_a_civilwar.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006)
(arguing that the promulgation of the constitution is not an amazing event,
but a process that will increase the chances of a civil war). David Phillips is a
senior fellow at the Council of Foreign relations who has worked with Iraqi
opposition political groups. Id.
2. Op-Ed., Agreeing to Disagree in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at
A19 (recognizing that although the Iraqi constitution is quite vague, it
confers upon Iraqis all the rights contained in international agreements that
Iraq has signed, as well as establishes democratic principles).
3. See generally Bureau of Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Background Note: Iraq (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Iraq] (reciting the history of Iraq the long periods of war and the years of oppression under Saddam Hussein).
See generally Cathal J. Nolan, The Longman Guide to World Affairs 182
(1995) (recounting the history of Iraq from a Mesopotamian civilization to a
present day sovereign nation).
1.

RELATIONS,
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a world-wide audience on October 15, 2005 as Iraqis risked their
lives to ratify their Constitution. 4 Only days before this historic
event, 5 Shiites, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds 6 alike negotiated and
4. Edward Wong, Final Tally Shows Iraqi Voters Approved New
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
10/25/internationallmiddleeast/25cnd-iraq.html?ex=1287892800&en=4e0
737cO063fO4c&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; see also Associated Press,
Iraq's Constitution Distributed to Citizens, MSNBC.com, Iraq's Constitution
Distributed to Citizens - Conflict in Iraq, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id9584857/print/I/displaymode/1098/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) ("[S]ome 4
million copies [were] printed in Arabic - at a rate of 250,000 a day .... "). See
Iraqi Election Results, by Province, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005,
http://fairuse.laccesshost.com/news5/nytll.htm (reporting through empirical
studies that two of the three Sunni dominated provinces largely rejected the
constitution, while the third province passed it by 15%). If the third Sunni
province had rejected the constitution, it would not have passed. See also
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Rice In Baghdad, Urges Sunni Role in the Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at Al (recounting Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's visit to Iraq and her encouragement to the Shiites and Kurds to
include the Sunni's in negotiations for a new constitution).
5. See Kirk Semple, Iraqi Rivals Trying to Fine-Tune Constitution for
Voter Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A8 (remarking that Iraqis made
last minute changes to the constitution in order to appeal to a wider audience
and hopefully insure ratification). See, e.g., Editorial, Off Course in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A28 (noting that some experts believed the
constitution to be a complete failure). The Iraqi Constitution, after a two
week extension, was completed and signed on August 28, 2005. See also
Dexter Filkins, Sunni Leaders Offer Mixed Views of Deal on Constitution,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
12,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/12/
internationallmiddleeast/12cndiraq.html?ex= 162180800&en=dd6b6f375497
4d42&ei=5070 (noting that throughout the negotiating process the Sunnis
have varied in their degree of participation and involvement). See also
Dexter Filkins & James Glanz, Leaders in Iraq Extend Deadline on
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at Al (insisting that forcing the
Iraqis to a consensus within a short period of time may increase tensions
among the major groups). On December 15, 2004, for the first time in Iraq's
history, eager Muslims and Kurds packed voting booths for the election of the
National Assembly, whose function would be to draft a permanent
constitution and then present it to the country for a national referendum on
October 15, 2005. Kristen A. Silt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking
of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 697 (2004). The
National Assembly succeeded in drafting a constitution defying many critics
and pessimists. The Iraqi Constitution, after a two week extension, was
completed and signed on August 28, 2005; Aneesh Raman, Cal Perry & Enes
Dulami, CNN.com - Committee Signs Iraq's Draft Constitution - Aug 28,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/28/iraq.constitution/index.
html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
6. See infra Part I.A.1 (identifying the three distinct groups that occupy
present day Iraq and their divergent interests and policies in the re-
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adamantly debated the language and structure of the constitution,
attempting to address the numerous issues facing an emerging
7
democracy in the Middle East.
One of the most significant and controversial issues of the
new constitution is the sphere of influence allotted to Islam 8 or

more specifically, whether the influence of Islam in the newly
drafted constitution undermines the principles of democracy set
forth therein. 9 If the constitution permits Islam a dominant
position and unfettered authority, it is likely that an Islamic
theocratic Iraq will be born. 10 An Islamic theocracy could possibly
lead to increased human rights violations, mistreatment of
women, and an oppressive state.II On the other hand, if the
influence of Islam is diminished and stifled, the Iraqi constitution
will never effectuate into respectable law. 12 Therefore, it is
important that the Iraqi constitution allow for an Islamic
influence, but not to the extent that democratic principles are
structuring of the Iraqi state).
7. See Iraq's Constitution: Democracy or Division?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
2005, at A5 (Iraq's constitution additionally faces the issues of federalism, oil
revenue, de-Baathification and equal rights).
8. David Rohde, A World of Ways to Say 'IslamicLaw', N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2005, § 4, at 4 (suggesting that the fateful question to address in Iraq is
what role Islam will have in the constitution). See Dexter Filkins, Leaders in
Iraq Report Progress on Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2005, at Al ("The
most sensitive of unresolved issues revolved around the role of Islam, which
the drafters have designated as 'a main source of legislation' in the new
constitution.").
9. This question assumes to a certain extent that Islam and democracy
are functionally compatible. See Ali Iyad Yakub, The Islamic Roots of
Democracy, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 269, 270 (2004) (arguing that
Islam and democracy are compatible in that they have the same objectives for
society, such as aims of justice, equality, freedom of expression and a fair
criminal procedure). But see Hugh Goddard, Islam and Democracy, POL. Q.
Jan.-Mar. 2002 at 3, 4 (2002) (arguing that Islam is the anathema to
democracy because Islam calls for a state governed by God).
10. See Filkins & Glanz, supra note 5, at A8 (emphasizing that the Shiite
Muslims are more than willing to form an Islamic theocracy).
11. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Book Review, InternationalHuman Rights
and Islamic Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 303 (2005) (stating that governments
rely on Islamic law to justify policies of discrimination, persecution and
repression).
12. See Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and The
Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 450 (2005)
(indicating that the principles Arab unity, nationalism, social and economic
justice are the core values upon which Iraq must build in order to have a
functioning, law-abiding society).
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compromised. 13
This Comment argues that the influence of Islam in the Iraqi
constitution
does
not undermine
fundamental
democratic
principles provided that it is strictly interpreted. 14 This Comment
draws from the constitutions of Egypt and Iran in order to
comprehend the status of Islam in the Iraqi constitution. 15 Egypt
and Iran represent opposite sides of the possible spectrum for
Iraq, the former being a secular democracy and the latter an
Islamic theocracy.' 6 This Comment individually evaluates articles
defining the influence of Islam in the Iraqi constitution and
contrasts those to similar articles in the Egyptian and Iranian
constitutions. 17 Part I presents a brief contextual overview of the
newly promulgated Iraqi Constitution and a summation of Islam

13. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2 (recognizing that experts
believe that Iraq has the potential to become a democratic or a theocratic
state).
14. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that through a strict
interpretation of the Iraqi Constitution a balance of Islam and democratic
principles is attainable); A. Kevin Reinhart, Reconstruction and Constitution
Building in Iraq, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 782-83 (2004) (admitting
that there are theocratic elements in the new Iraqi constitution, but there
was not much sentiment in Iraq for a great theocracy).
15. Turkey is only briefly mentioned in the footnotes of this Comment
because, although Turkey is considered a Muslim democracy, it is too secular
for Iraq at this time. See Silt, supra note 5, at 716 (suggesting that Turkey's
focus on ways to separate religion and state and to exclude Islam is
unrealistic for Iraq).
See also Susan Sachs, Are Islam & Democracy
Compatible?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at 20 (Upfront) (considering Turkey
as making the most progress toward a democracy of the Muslim nations of
the world).
16. Andrew Grossman, "Islamic Land" Group Rights, National Identity
and Law, 3 UCLA J. ISLAMIc & NEAR E. L. 53, 71 (2003-04). Iran is
considered an Islamic state while Egypt is considered a secular democracy.
Id. Iraq's constitution could conceivably set up a system comparable to either
of these states. See Silt, supra note 5, at 699 (noting that Egypt provides a
useful comparative tool to shed light in Iraq's current legal situation and the
shape it may take in the future); see Filkins & Glanz, supra note 5, at A8
(observing that Shiite leaders were planting the seeds for an Islamic
theocracy); see supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining that Turkey
is far too secular for Iraq at this time because of its extreme separation of
church and state).
17. This Comment analyzes the constitutions of Iraq, Iran and Egypt in a
limited fashion, focusing principally upon key articles pertaining to religion,
democracy and Islam.
This Comment is not comprehensive, but only
examines the most significant articles pertaining to Islam and democracy
from each constitution.
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in each state's respective constitution, focusing on the articles
Part II dissects each
principally concerned with Islam.
constitution into separate sections and then explores and
compares the provisions relevant to the influence of Islam and
The preamble, 18 source of law provision, 19 and
democracy.
protection of Islam provision of each state are highlighted in order
to demonstrate the ambit of influence attributed to Islam and
democracy. 20 As well, Part II examines the judiciary of each state,
canvassing the provisions describing the function and composition
of the highest court and personal status courts (courts concerned
with personal and family law). 2 1 Finally, Part III concludes that
Iraq will achieve a balance of Islam and democratic principles so
long as the constitution is strictly interpreted by judges familiar
2
with Islam.

2

I. BACKGROUND

The constitutions of Iraq, Iran and Egypt each contain
provisions which, implicitly and explicitly, allocate authority to
Islam and protect democratic principles. Highlighting and
isolating these provisions in the constitution of each respective
state provides an illustrative indication of Islam's possible scope of
23
influence.

18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.
21. See discussion infra Parts II.D & E. Courts of personal status in the
Muslim world mainly apply Islamic law to marriage, divorce and inheritance
cases. See Farnaz Fassihi, Iraq Constitution Talks Hit Impasse; Divisions
Over Islamic Law, Regional Governments' Role Remain as Deadline Looms,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A3. See generally Melanie D. Reed, Western
Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The Application of Shari'a in a Modern
World, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 485, 487 (2004) (discussing the role of Islamic
courts in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world and raising the issue as to
whether Islamic courts do in fact adequately protect basic human rights).
22. See discussion infra Parts III.A-D (recommending that the
constitution be literally and strictly construed by judges schooled in Islamic
law).
23. See discussion infra Part I.A-C (denoting the provisions in the
constitutions of Iraq, Iran and Egypt pertinent to Islam's scope of power and
democratic principles).
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A. The Republic of Iraq's Constitution
1. The Context of the Newly PromulgatedConstitution
The population of Iraq consists of three principle groups:
Shiite Muslims, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. 24
Engaging and
appeasing each unique group in formulating the new constitution
proved to be a monumental task given that each group brought
distinct interests and concerns to the negotiating table. 2 5
The Shiite Muslims, who make up the majority of the
population of Iraq, believed Islam warranted an imperious role in
the new constitution. 26 Their liberation from a state of oppression
under Saddam Hussein invigorated their desire for a powerful,
centralized, religious-oriented government.2 7
In staunch
opposition, the Sunni Arab minority, whom affiliated with the
Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein, sought a de-centralized
government, attempting to preserve their self-governance. 28 The
24. See Iraq, supra note 3 (stating that the two largest ethnic groups are
Arabs and Kurds and that most Iraqi Muslims are Shiites, but there is also a
large Sunni population made of both Arabs and Kurds).
25. See James Glanz, Constitution or Divorce Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2005, § 4, at 1, 4 (providing that due to the large differences between the
people, Iraq is threatening to become "a collection of independent fiefs, none
truly viable as full-fledged nations, that are locked in a civil war").
26. Fassihi, supra note 21 (some Shiite groups have called for the
establishment of an Islamic state similar to Iran). See Pub. Int'l Law &
Policy Group & The Century Found., Establishing a Stable Democratic
Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic Considerations (2003),
http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/reports/IraqReport.pdf
[hereinafter Stable Democratic ConstitutionalStructure]. However, under the
current system, the Shiites should have a substantial representation because
they represent 60% of the population. Iraq, supra note 3.
27. See Tough Shiite, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 22, 2004, at 7 (explaining
that during the negotiating process, the Shiites had objectives of enabling the
majority and increasing their influence).
28. Stable Democratic ConstitutionalStructure, supra note 26, at 9. The
Sunni make up an estimated 32-37% of the Iraqi population. Iraq, supra note
3. When the rest of Iraqis went to the poles in January of 2005 to vote, most
of the Sunnis stayed home in a planned boycott, thus giving them a limited
role in drafting the constitution. See Oppel, supra note 4 (reporting that while
in Iraq, Condoleezza Rice urged the Shiite-dominated government to increase
the involvement of the Sunni minority in the constitution). See also Greg
Jaffe, For U.S. Military,A Key Iraq Mission Is Adverting Civil War, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 2005, at Al (observing that in order to produce political harmony
among groups and avoid a civil war, the Sunnis needed to be more involved).
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Sunni also believed Islam warranted a domineering role in the

new constitution, but follow a different strand of Islam from that
of the Shiites. 29 Finally, the minority Kurds, whom are also
Muslim but differ in language, dress and customs, wanted to
maintain their autonomy in the North and limit Islam's influence
30
in the constitution.
The Sunni's wanted a weak central government, allowing more power to the
states, so in effect they can continue to rule as they did in the former Iraq.
See Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure, supra note 26, at 9 (stating
that in addition to a weak central government, the Sunnis are concerned
about profits from oil). Since the majority of Sunnis are in central Iraq, they
lack access to the oil rich land found in the north and south and fear they will
be denied access. Id. In response to this concern, days before the national
referendum, both the Shiites and Kurds conceded to distribute more evenly
the oil profits in order to encourage Sunni support. See A Nearly Final
Constitution, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 41 (noting the disagreement
over the distribution of oil profits). See also Fassihi, supra note 21 ("The
Kurds want control of a significant share of the oil revenues..., while the
Shiites and Sunnis contend that revenues should be controlled by the central
government.").
The Sunnis ultimately participated in the referendum on October 15,
2005, which was a positive step toward forming a new government, even
though most Sunnis voted against the referendum. See Wong, supra note 4
(explaining that two Sunni provinces rejected the constitution and the third
one approved it). Sunni Arab leaders say they will focus on winning seats in
the new parliament and push for changes. See id.
29. See Mougeh Shisheneh Mozafarian, Note, The Fallacy of Hejab in
Iran: A Critique of Islamic Judicial Review as Performed by the Guardian
Council of the Islamic Republic, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 279, 28586 (2003) (noting that one of the major differences between the Sunni and
Shiites is how Islamic law is interpreted and rationalized). Shiites believe
divine Islamic Law can flexibly apply to new situations while the Sunni
believe the law has been fixed for centuries. Id. See Jaffe, supra note 28
(deep divisional rivets and hatred among the Sunni and Shiite have caused
significant casualties since the commencement of the new Iraqi government).
30. Iraq, supra note 3.
The Kurds make up much of the northern
population of Iraq. Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure, supra note
27, at 9. At the end of the twentieth century, the Kurds attempted to rebel
and leave Iraq. Id. To qualm the rebellion, Saddam Hussein attempted to
dispose of the Kurds using chemical weapons of mass destruction leading to
the death of nearly 200,000 Kurds. See generally Human Rights Watch,
Genocide in Iraq: the Anfal campaigning against the Kurds (1993),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006)
(explaining that Saddam Hussein caused the Kurds to flee their city of
Kirkuk and as a result, in 1992, the United States and Britain established a
no-fly zone in order to protect the Kurds).
The Kurds are interested in maintaining their autonomy and favor a
de-centralized government. See Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure,
supra note 26, at 15 (observing that the Kurds desire a Kurdish Region which
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Through deliberation and debate the three groups finally
arrived at a consensus on August 28, 2005, marking a
31
revolutionary day in the Middle East.
2. The Preamble
The Republic of Iraq's 32 Constitution's preamble commences
by nobly acknowledging the country's origin and heritage: "We are
the people of the land between two rivers, the homeland of the
apostles and prophets, abode of the virtuous imams, 33 pioneers of
'34
civilization, crafters of writing and cradle of numeration.
In the subsequent paragraph, the preamble calls attention to
the fact that Iraqis voted for the first time on January 30, 2005 "in
' 35
response to the call of [their] religious and national leadership.
The preamble then laments the torture, oppression and terror
endured under the iron fist of Saddam Hussein and dramatically
proclaims the Iraq of the future "free from sectarianism, racism,
'36
locality complex, discrimination and exclusion.
The system of government identified in the preamble grants
"an equal opportunity for all"37 by providing "a republican, federal,

would allow them to "preserve and expand their existing level of self-rule").
Kurds, whom are more secular than the other groups, would also like to
minimize the effects of Islam in the Republic of Iraq. See generally A Nearly
Final Constitution, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining that the "secular-minded
Kurds fear an Islamic theocracy").
31. Raman, supra note 5; see Glanz, supra note 25 (insisting that the
balance between Islam and democracy in Iraq "could form the basis for a form
of government that would be revolutionary in the Middle East").
32. It is interesting to note that the drafters heavily disputed the name of
Iraq. Nathan Brown, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution:Analysis and
Commentary 3 (2005), available at http:www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
FinalDraftSeptl6.pdf. The debate was whether Iraq should be called a
federal and/or Islamic state. Id. For the final draft of the Constitution, the
drafters dropped the proposal for Iraq to be named an Islamic state and
choose the name the country has held since 1958, the Republic of Iraq. Id.
33. An Imam is a Muslim leader said to have direct succession from
Muhammad, and therefore in theory is the divinely appointed and rightful
ruler of the faithful. Nolan, supranote 3, at 167.
34. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. pmbl.
35.

Id.

36.

Id. For a comprehensive study of the history of Iraq, see generally

CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 5-6 (2d ed. 2002) (recounting Iraq's history

of social conflict, wars, dictators and politics).
37. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. pmbl.
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democratic, pluralistic system. ''38 Accordingly, the preamble calls
upon all Iraqis to "respect the rules of law, to establish justice and
equality [and] to cast aside the politics of aggression. '39 Finally,
in the last paragraph, the Iraqis declare that they "freely choose to
'40
draft this lasting constitution.
3. Islam's Source of Authority Provision
When drafting Article 2(1), the drafters 4 1 struck an impasse
in deciding whether Islam should be "a" main source of legislation
or "the" main source of legislation. 42 After a drawn-out debate,
they

ultimately

legislation."

43

decided

for

Islam

to be "a

main

source

of

4. Protectionof Islam and Democracy Provisions
The drafters of the Iraqi constitution addressed freedom of
38.
39.

Id.
Id. See generally Wael. B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law,
54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705 (2002-03) (observing that because of the attacks of
September 11th, Western notions of Islam tend to see the violence as
causally connected with the entire religion of Islam; it is true that Islamic
fundamentalists can be aggressive, but it is not an inherently violent
religion).
40. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. pmbl. The Kurds
stressed the word "freely" to demonstrate that each group (Sunnis, Shiites
and Kurds) freely chose to join the Republic of Iraq and thus, in the event the
Kurds decide to succeed, they would have no obligation to remain with Iraq.
Brown, supranote 32, at 1.
41. See John F. Burns, Iraq Legislators Set Up Panel to Draft
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A9 (discussing the committee
selected to draft the Iraq's permanent constitution, who consisted of 28
members of the Shiite alliance and 27 nominees from other groups).
42. Brown, supra note 32, at 2; John F. Burns, Shiites Offer to Give
Sunnis Larger Role on Broader Panel Writing a Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2005, at A16 (stating that Islam was made just one of the sources of
legislation to act as a shield against an Iranian theocracy). See Fassihi,
supra note 22 (acknowledging that the Shiites want to give Islam a
dominating presence in the government). See also A Nearly Final
Constitution, supra note 28 (noting that the language on Islam aroused much
argument, especially among the Kurds who feared an Islamic theocracy).
43. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. II, § 1. Some
versions of the constitution translate this article as "a basic source of
legislation." Associated Press, Test of Iraq's Draft Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2005, at http://www.nytimes.com2005/10/12/international/middleeast
/12web-itex.html?ex=1162270800&en=735586f8979 le9d7&ei=5070
(emphasis added).
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religion through Articles 2(1)(a) and 2(2), the former addressing
Islam specifically in requiring that "no law that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam may be established. '44 Article 2(2),
addressing a broader notion of religion, protects religion by
guarantying that all individuals will have full "freedom of
45
religious belief and practice."
The constitution addresses democracy through three different
provisions, each dealing with a different aspect of democracy.
Article 2(1)(b), which applies to the judiciary and parliament,
boldly requires that no law will be established that "contradicts
the principles of democracy. ''46
Article 1 addresses the
government as a whole, describing it as representative and
democratic. 4 7 Finally, Article 5 concerns the democratic processes
of Iraq, providing that the people are the source of authority and
that the "transfer of authority shall be made peacefully through
48
democratic means."
5. The Supreme Federal Court and PersonalStatus Courts

Articles 89 and 90 delineate the composition and jurisdiction
of the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court.4 9 Article 89(2) requires that
44. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. II, § 1A.A prior
Associated Press/N.Y Times translation states that "no law can be passed
that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam." Associated Press, Text draft
of the constitution, Aug. 28, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/08/28/international
/iraqtextnew.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). Nathan
Brown, an Islamic expert, translated this article as "No law can be passed
that contradicts the fixed elements of the rulings of Islam." Brown, supra
note 32, at 2. For the purposes of this Comment, the difference is minor
because Brown and the Associated Press both agree that the phrase generally
suggests that no legislation shall contradict Islam.
45. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. II, § 2. There are
other articles guaranteeing religious rights which put into place general
provisions of religious freedom. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of
Iraq. art. 41, § 1B & 2. ("The follower of all religion and sects are free in the
practice of religious rites ...[and] ...[t]he state guarantees freedom of
worship and the protection of worship places.").
46. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. II, § lB. See
Iraq's Constitution: Democracy or Division, supra note 7 (stating that
according to one survey, 88% of Iraqi's approved of keeping this clause in the
constitution).
47. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 1.
48. Id. at art. 5.
49. Id. at art. 89, 90. Federal Supreme Court Judges shall be elected "by
a two-third majority of the members of the Council of Representatives." The
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"the Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of
judges, and experts in Islamic jurisprudence and law experts
whose number, the method of their selection and the work of the
court shall be determined by a law enacted by two-thirds of the
members of the Council of Representatives. 50 Article 90(1) and (2)
endow the Supreme Federal Court with jurisdictional authority,
namely, "oversight of the constitutionality of the laws . . . and

interpretation of the provisions of the constitution." 5 1
In regard to personal status courts, Article 92 prohibits
"special or exceptional courts. '52 However, Article 39 grants
Iraqis freedom "in their commitment to their personal status
according to their religions," with the condition that this provision
53
be regulated by law.

B. The Islamic Republic of Iran's Constitution
1. The Preamble
The Islamic Republic of Iran's preamble openly declares itself
"an Iranian society based on Islamic principles and norms, which
represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. ' '54 The
Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 2. See Kirk Semple, The
Struggle for Iraq: Compromises; ConstitutionPanel Proposes Some Limits on
Role of Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A9 (reporting that some drafters
said the constitution should not grant political authority to the country's
religious leaders).
50. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 93. Due to the
disputes and disagreements regarding the court, the drafters deferred many
of the details of the court to legislation. See Brown, supra note 32, at 10
(explaining that the Council of Representatives is the Iraqi parliament or
legislative branch of government).
51. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 90 §§ 1, 2. Other
matters fall within the jurisdiction of the courts. See, e.g., id. at art. 90 § 3,
(settling matters that arise from the application of the federal laws); id. at
art. 90 § 4 (settling disputes between the federal government and regional
governments); id. at art. 90 § 6 (settling accusations directed against The
President, Prime Minister and the Ministers); id. at art. 90 § 7 (ratifying the
final results of the general elections for the Council of Representatives).
52. Id. at art. 92.
53. Id. at art. 44; see Reed, supra note 21, at 497 (explaining that
religious courts in the Muslim world may make some members of the
community "feel forced to live up to standards in which they do not fully
believe").
54. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [Constitution] pmbl. (Iran);
see Nolan, supra note 3, at 183 (explaining that an Ummah is the ultimate
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preamble attributes the pain and suffering of Iran during the
early and middle of the twentieth century to a departure from
genuine Islamic principles. 55 The revolution of 1979 ended these
years of blood and struggle, enabling the emergence of an Islamic
state governed by the Koran. 56 In fact, the preamble necessitates
that the government "revolve around the Koran and the
Sunnah. '' 57 Not surprisingly, numerous passages in the preamble
58
cite verses directly from the Koran.
The preamble also predicates Iran's objective to "guarantee
the rejection of all forms of intellectual and social tyranny and
economic monopoly." 59 In effect, the aforementioned objective
competes with the other main objective, namely "to realize the
ideological objectives of the [Islamic] movement and develop man
' '60
in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam.
2. Islam's Source of Authority Provision
The Iranian Constitution grants authority to Islam under
aspiration of the Iranians, namely an Islamic Community).
55. Iran Const. pmbl ("[T]he Muslim people of Iran learned from this
costly experience that the obvious and fundamental reason for the failure of
those movements was their lack of an ideological basis.").
56. Iran Const. art 1.; see also HAMID R. KUSHA, THE SACRED LAW OF
ISLAM: A CASE STUDY OF WOMEN'S TREATMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2003) ("The Qur'an [Koran] is believed to

represent the verbatim word of God, gradually revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad within a period of twenty-three years (610-632)."); Mozafarian,
supra note 29, at 283 (defining the Koran as the set of God's revelations, as
revealed through the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Mohammed). The Koran
consists of the core beliefs of Islamic society and establishes the criteria for
being Muslim. Id.
57. Iran Const. pmbl; see Mozafarian, supra note 29, at 284 (defining the
Sunnah as an assemblage of laws deduced from the Prophet Mohammed's
saying or conduct); see also KUSHA, supra note 56, at 3 (explaining that the
Sunnah plays a secondary role to the Qur'an [Koran], which is the primary
authority). When the Koran is silent, the Sunnah is the next source to be
consulted. Id.
58. Iran Const. pmbl. The Koran is directly quoted seven times in the
preamble. Id. For example, when describing the divine order of Islam, the
preamble quotes the Koran, 3:28 "And toward God is the journeying." Id.
59. ,Id.
60. Id. See Reed, supra note 21, at 509 (stating that a primary goal of
Islam is "to create an Islamic community that brings all people, equal before
God, together in a community founded upon God"); see infra Part I.B.4
(suggesting that the Iranian Council of Guardians in effect oppressively rules
the people in order to fullfil Islamic objectives).
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Article 4, which provides that "[a]ll civil, penal, financial,
economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other
laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. ''6 1 This
principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the
62
constitution, as well as to all other laws and regulations.
Additionally, many provisions in the constitution contain the
precondition that they are "in accordance with the law of Islam.

'63

3. Protectionof Islam and Democracy Provisions
Iran lacks a true freedom of religion provision and instead
recognizes in Article 13 "Zoroastrian,6 4 Jewish, and Christian
Iranians as the only religious minorities who are free to perform
their religious rites and ceremonies within the limits of the law." 6 5
Likewise, the constitution lacks a provision protecting Islam, but
instead goes a step further by actively requiring all regulations to
66
be founded in Islamic criteria.
The constitution contains numerous articles protecting
democratic principles, the most significant of them being Article 6,
which states "the administration shall be based on public opinion

expressed by the means of elections. ''6 7 Along with insuring
democratic elections, the constitution also provides for
fundamental democratic rights such as equality of rights, equal
protection, freedom of press, secrecy of communication, freedom of

61. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art. 4.
62.

Id. See ASGHAR

SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN 10 (John O'Kane

trans., 1998) ("Article 2 binds legislation to the Sharia by representing
legislation as power reserved for God and acknowledging that revelation has
a fundamental role in the promulgation of laws.").
63. See id. at 11 ("[T]he articles which describe the rights of the people in
general and the democratic rights of the citizens in particular always include
the precondition that these rights must be compatible with Islamic ideals and
principles or simply with 'the law' (naturally, Islamic law is meant).").
64. See Grossman, supra note 16, at 83 ("According to Islam, religions are
classed by degrees of preference as follows: Islam, Judaism, Christianity,
Zoroastrianism ... and in last place polytheists." (quoting Sami Awad Aldeeb
Abu-Sahlieh, Limpact de la religion rue l'ordrejuridique, NON-MUSULMANS
EN PAYS D'IsLAM 256 (1979))).
65. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art. 13.
66. Id. at art. 14.
67. Id. at art. 6.
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association and freedom of assembly. 68
4. The GuardianCouncil and Personal Status Courts
In order to safeguard Islamic ordinances and the constitution,
Article 91 promulgates a Guardian Council consisting of six
religious men, 69 conscious of the present needs and issues of the
day, and six jurists, specializing in different areas of the law,
selected by the head of judicial power. 70 The Guardian Council
has authority under Articles 94 and 96 to review all legislation
passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian legislature)
and the power to determine the compatibility of legislation with
71
the constitution.
If the powers mentioned above are not enough, under Article
99, the Guardian Council supervises the elections of
representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and also
acts as the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda. 72 In
practice, all courts are based on Islamic law, which includes courts
of personal status. 73 All provisions and judiciary structure
considered, Iran's non-restrictive and liberating approach to
74
Islamic law has essentially created a Islamic theocratic state.
68. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art. 19-27. Iran's Constitution also
expressly protects women's rights, but with a condition that the article is "in
conformity with Islamic criteria." Id. at art. 21.
69. See Sachs, supra note 15, at 21 (religious clerics can cite Islamic law
to void legislation and disqualify candidates for public office).
70. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art. 91; SCHIRAZI, supra note 62, at 12
(indicating that the only jurists entitled to rule are committed experts on
Islam who are distinguished as God fearing men and who hold some sort of
religious office).
71. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art. 94, 96. The Constitution itself gives
the Guardian Council authority to interpret the constitution. Id. at art. 98.
72. Id. at art. 99.
73. See Mozafarian, supra note 29, at 289 (explaining that the entire
judiciary is subject to the review by the Guardian Council based on its
compatibility with Islam).
74. See Silt, supra note 5, at 717 (explaining that Iran is an Islamic
Republic where all state affairs are subrogated to the review of religious
leaders); see The Law of Man or the Law of God?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13,
2003, at 11 (insisting that Iran epitomizes the opposite of democracy); Bureau
of Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Iran (2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006)
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C. The Arab Republic of Egypt's Constitution
1. The Preamble
The Arab Republic of Egypt's preamble, referred to as the
constitutional proclamation, 75 begins by declaring the Egyptian
people confident in their profound faith and respectful of the
honor of man and humanity. 76 The preamble pledges to realize
four objectives: "(1) Peace based on justice and freedom, (2) Arab
Unity, (3) development of life through the nation, and the (4)
freedom for the humanity of the Egyptian man." 77

While the

preamble applauds protections of democracy and addresses faith
78
generally, it fails to mention Islam specifically.
The preamble concludes by asserting a pledge to protect the
country through furthering democracy and upholding the
fundamental principles of "freedom, socialism and unity. 79
2. Islam's Source of Authority Provision
After heated debate among drafters,8 0 Article 2 of the 1971
Egyptian Constitution stipulated that "the Islamic Sharia 8 l is a

[hereinafter Iran] (noting that "Iran's relations with many of its Arab
neighbors have been strained by Iranian attempts to spread its Islamic
revolution").
75. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] pmbl.
76. Id.
77. Id. See generally Bureau of Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Background Note: Egypt (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Egypt] (discussing the history,
government, economy and people of Egypt).
78. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] pmbl.
79. Id.
80. See Clark Benner Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of
Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalizationof the Sharia in a
Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 85 (1998) (delineating the
vigorous public debate that occurred on the issue of how much Islamic
influence should be in the new constitution).
81. "Sharia law is the technical term for 'Islamic law."' Id. at 91 (quoting
'Adb al-Halim Mahmud, Debate on the Application of Shari'a in Egypt, AlAhram, May 7, 1976). It is the body of rules that God revealed to men in the
sacred texts of Islam. Id. Muslims consider obedience to the Sharia to be a
crucial religious duty." Id.
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main source of legislation."8 2 However, as opposition increased
from proponents of Islam, 83 the government amended Article 2 in
1980 to "the principles of the Islamic Sharia are the main source of
legislation." 84 Since the reformation of Article 2, the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) has interpreted the article by applying
a two part test: (1) the authenticity of the text [Koran] must be
proven beyond doubt; and (2) there must be one absolutely clear
meaning of the text.8 5
In effect, this test has reduced the
application of Sharia law to limited circumstances. 86
3. Protectionof Religion and Democracy
The Egyptian Constitution, pursuant to Article 46, generally
protects religion in "guarantying the freedom of belief and the
freedom of practice of religious rites," but does not specifically
87
mention Islam.
The Egyptian Constriction recognizes democracy from the
very beginning of the constitution by describing Egypt as a
democratic, socialist state where the people alone are the source of
authority.8 8
Later in the text, the constitution additionally
guarantees freedom of opinion, freedom of press, freedom of
89
assembly and human rights.
4. Supreme ConstitutionalCourt (SCC) and Personal Status
Courts
Pursuant to Article

82.

175, the SCC has the authority to

Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab

Republic of Egypt] art. 2 (as originally set forth in the 1971 constitution)
(emphasis added).
83. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 86 (finding that because the proIslamist movements had grown too powerful in Egypt, the government was
forced to make changes). Consequently, in 1980 the government amended
the constitution to give Islam a more influential role. See id.
84. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] art. 2 (amended version) (emphasis added).
85. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 99.
86. See Silt, supra note 5, at 727 (acknowledging that the two part test
passed by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) made it much more
difficult for Sharia law to invalidate legislation).
87. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] art. 46.
88. Id. at art. 1.
89. Id. at art. 47-48, 70.
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"undertake the judicial control in respect of the constitutionality of
the laws and regulations . . . in

accordance with the manner

prescribed by law."90 The composition of the court is described by
Article 176, which states that "[t]he law shall organize the way of
formation of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and prescribe the
conditions to be fulfilled by its members." 9 1 The constitution is
silent in regard to requirements for judges and personal status
courts. 9 2
Due to Egypt's judicial structure and constitutional
93
protections of democracy, it is considered a secular democracy.
II. ANALYSIS

The Iraqi Constitution, although ambiguous in certain
respects, aligns itself closer to an Egyptian secular democracy
than an Iranian theocracy. 94 Through Iraq's historically founded
preamble and unique, meticulous approach to Islam, the drafters
appeased the potentially hostile tension between Islam and
democracy by fully respecting the history of Islam while protecting
95
democratic principles.

90. Id. at art. 175; see Lombardi, supra note 81, at 83 (comparing the
SCC to the United States Supreme Court because the SCC is the supreme
source of law, whose interpretation of a constitution is binding upon all other
courts).
91. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] art. 176.
92. Nathan J. Brown, Arab Judicial Structures: A Study to the United
Nations Development Program, http://www.undp-pogar.org/publications/
judiciary /nbrown/egypt.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
93. See Egypt, supra note 77 ("Egypt's judicial system is based on
European (primarily French) legal concepts and methods."). Additionally, the
Egyptian constitution provides for a strong executive with the authority
vested in the President.
Id.
Courts have demonstrated increasing
independence and the principles of due process and judicial review are more
widely accepted. Id.
94. See discussion infra Part II. A-D (comparing Iraq's preamble and
other provisions concerning Islam to the preamble and similar provisions in
the Iranian and Egyptian constitutions).
95. See Yakub, supra note 9, at 270 ("Despite the fact that some political
thinkers believe Islam is hostile to democracy, there are in fact numerous
references in Islamic jurisprudence that pertain to representative
government, respect for the rule of law, and individual freedom.").
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A. The Iraqi Preamble Recognizes a Heritage of Islam While
SafeguardingPrinciplesof Democracy.
Iraq's preamble demonstrates a balance between Islam and
democratic principles and generally suggests that the drafters
intended that the constitution allocate equal weight to each,
similar to Egypt's Constitution. 96 The first sentence identifies the
two authorities who brought the state into being: religious leaders
- the prophets, apostles, and imams and secular leaders pioneers of civilization and crafters of writing. 9 7 This sentence
indicates the existence of an ideological harmony among religious
and secular leaders in Iraq. 98 Additionally, the preamble credits
both religious and national authorities with inspiring and guiding
the state to a new constitution. 9 9 Thus, the preamble creates a
harmonious backdrop of democracy and Islam while implicitly
urging the furtherance of this harmony throughout the
constitution. 100

The preamble also focuses on the evolution of Iraq from an
oppressed state to a democratic state. 10 1 It highlights the fact that
all Iraqis freely voted their leaders into office in the elections of
January 15, 2005 and suggests that Iraq, as a democratic state,
has reached the apex of its civilization.' 02 Thus, while praising
and honoring a heritage of Islam, the preamble strongly
recognizes the importance of democratic principles. 10 3 This
96.

See discussion infra Part I.A.2 (describing the Iraqi preamble and its

effort to balance principles of democracy with Islam).
97. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. pmbl.
98. See generally TRIPP, supra note 36, at 5 (relating the principle
political structures and ideologies of Iraq).
99. Cf. Brown, supra note 32, at 2 (discussing the debates that occurred
as both religious and civil authorities negotiated the issues of the
constitution).
See generally Silt, supra note 5 (relating an extensive
background on the drafting of the interim constitution).
100. See discussion infra Part I.A.2 (relating aspects of the preamble to
the Iraqi Constitution in order to demonstrate that drafters intended both
democracy and Islam to balance one another not only in the preamble, but
throughout the entire constitution).
101. See generally Bali, supra note 12, at 431-33 (discussing the downfall
of Iraq's former dictator Saddam Hussein and the rise of a movement of
freedom in Iraq).
102. See generally Iraq, supra note 3 (recounting Iraq's evolution from an
oppressed state under a dictatorship to a newly emerging democracy).
103. See discussion infra Part I.A.3 (providing the principle references to
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established balance extends beyond the borders of the preamble
itself and overflows into the constitution, demanding the mutual
104
existence of Islam and democracy.
Similar to Iraq, Egypt's constitutional proclamation
(preamble) conveys a message of moderation between Islam and
The constitutional proclamation admonishes
democracy. 105
democratic principles while at the same time acknowledging an
Arabic heritage. 106 In the first sentence, Egypt sets forth the
objectives of freedom, socialism and unity, demonstrating a firm
commitment to democracy. 107 At the same time, the proclamation
honors Islam by identifying the people as strong in their profound
108
faith and by envisioning the objective of Arab unity.
Conversely, the Iranian preamble is distinguished from Iraq's
because of the lack of references to democratic principles and
heavy emphasis on Islam. 10 9 The Iranian preamble forecasts an
Islamic theocracy and permits Islamic jurisprudence unfettered
authority. 110 It calls for an Iranian Islamic Republic "based on
both democracy and Islam in the Iraqi preamble).
104. See also Yakub, supra note 9, at 299 (acknowledging that there are
difficulties interpreting Islamic law in changing times just as the United
States struggles to interpret the constitution in changing times, but in the
end Islamic law is compatible with democracy and in fact started as a religion
that liberated people from political oppression and social inequality).
105. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] pmbl.
106. See discussion supra part I.C.1 (discussing Egypt's constitutional
proclamation and the articles upholding Islam and protecting democracy).
107. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] pmbl. ("[We] carry the responsibility of great present and
future objectives whose seeds are embedded in the long and arduous struggle,
and which hosted the flags of freedom, socialism and unity along the path
108.

See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab

Republic of Egypt], translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE

WORLD (Omer Faruk Genckaya trans., Gisbert H. Flan ed., 2003) Turkey, a
more secular state than Egypt and Iraq, focuses on rights and freedoms of the
individual in its preamble by requiring equality and social justice while
striving to "attain to the level of contemporary civilization." The Constitution
of The Republic of Turkey pmbl.
109. See Hallaq, supra note 39, at 1714 (suggesting that the Iranian
revolution was one of many movements through out the world constituting a
resurgence of fundamentalist Islam); See Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai
Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] pmbl.
110. See Iran, supra note 74 (recounting that after the Iranian revolution
(described in the preamble), a theocratic republic was formed where clergy
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Islamic principles" that unflinchingly adheres to the Koran and
Sunnah."'l Moreover, after attributing the pain and torture of
Iran in the twentieth century to an Islamic apostasy,11 2 Iran
aspires to build an ideal Islamic society, neglecting to mention
1 13
principles such as equality, freedom of religion or social justice.
Thus, from a preamble perspective, Iraq resembles a
moderate state respective of democratic principles, comparable to
Egypt's secular democracy."l 4 Both Iraq and Egypt recognize their
Islamic origins and history, but at the same time exhibit a
democratic ideology through their preambles. 1 15
As to the
possibility of an Islamic theocracy, Iraq's preamble unequivocally
1
distances itself from Iran's Islam dominated preamble. 16
B. Article 2(1) of the Iraqi Constitution GrantsIslam Less
Authority than Iran and Egypt.
Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution, providing that Islam is a
main source of law, still leaves question and ambiguity as to the
ambit of Islam in Iraq. 1 7 This article contains two parts subject to
18
interpretation: (1) "Islam" and (2) "a main source of legislation."
The term "Islam" could include, but is not limited to, Sharia law,
Fiqh law, Islamic jurisprudence and general principles of Islam.19
dominated the key power structures).
111. See infra notes 56-57 (defining both the Koran and the Sunnah as
sacred Islam texts).
112. See Reed, supra note 21, at 516 (explaining that some Muslims' right
to hold and practice their religion includes the right to prohibit apostasy from
their faith).
113. See Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980].
114. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.1 (describing the preambles of Egypt and
Iraq and highlighting their focus on Islam and democracy).
115. See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] pmbl; The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq.
pmbl.
116. See supra Parts I.A.2 & I.C.1 (identifying provisions in the preambles
that show the deep contrast between Iraq and Iran in their approaches to
Islam).
117. Anne Gearan, Iraq Constitution Said Vague on Some Points,
Associated Press, Aug. 29, 2005, at 1. In order to please all sides, they had to
leave the language broad enough so Shiites, Sunni Arabs and Kurds could at
least support and ratify the constitution. Id.
118. Silt, supra note 5, at 741 (emphasis added).
119. See Reed, supra note 21, at 504 (explaining that "[t]he Sharia, the
Islamic law derived from the Koran and the Prophet Muhummad's example,
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This signifies that Article 2 could either allow Islam a general
120
presence in Iraqi jurisprudence or call for a specific Islamic law.
The second part of Article 2, "a main source of legislation,"
implicitly acknowledges that there are other sources of law apart
from Islam, but that Islam is a main source of law.12 1 The word
"main" could imply that Islam will serve as Iraq's primary and
dominating law or that Islam is one of many "main sources of
legislation."' 122 Thus, Article 2 does in fact limit Islamic law by
constricting it to "a" source of legislation, but there is still the
possibility of Islam deriving unfettered authority from this article,
23
thus leading Iraq to an Islamic theocracy.1
Iran, in contrast to Iraq, overtly permits Islam unfettered
influence pursuant to Article 4, which requires that Islamic
criteria be the foundation for all regulations. 124 In addition,
numerous articles in the Iranian constitution contain the
condition that the articles are only applicable if "in accordance
with the law" (meaning Islamic law) or "in accordance with the
law of Islam."'125 Thus, Islam effectively infiltrates and pervades
is broadly defined as the way in which Muslims seek order in the society on
earth"); Silt, supra note 5, at 721 (stating that the Arabic term for the legal
doctrine produced from the Sharia is fiqh, which means discernment or
comprehension). While Sharia is divine law, Fiqh is human knowledge about
the Sharia. Id.
120. See generally Lombardi, supra note 80, at 85 (denoting the trouble
and difficulty of Egypt in defining a similar article in its constitution).
121. See Silt, supra note 5, at 742 (attributing the vagueness of Article 2 to
the strategy of the diverse drafting parties) (emphasis added).
122. See generally Rohde, supra note 8 (elaborating on the role of Islam in
the Iraqi constitution and the question as to its scope).
123. See discussion infra II.D (emphasizing the large impact that the
Federal Supreme Court will have on the interpretation of Article 2 and the
ever prevalent danger of an Islamic theocracy); see also A Nearly Final
Constitution,supra note 28, at Al (arguing that the role of Islamic law should
not be enshrined in the constitution, but left to future elected parliaments).
This is yet another reason why the make up of the constitutional court in
Iraq is important. See id.
124. Likewise, Saudi Arabia, almost as liberal in allocating power to
Islam, if not more so than Iran, declares the Holy Koran its constitution.
Bureau of Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Saudi
Arabia (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm (last visited Nov.
29, 2006). Article 7 states that the Government in Saudi Arabia derives
power from the Holy Koran and the Prophet's tradition. The Constitution of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia art. 7, available at http://www.
oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/saOOOOO_.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
125. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (insisting and arguing
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every article of the Iranian Constitution. 126
Article 2 in the Egyptian Constitution is also distinct from
Iraq's Article 2 because of its strength in wording. 127 Egypt
defines "Islam" as "the principles of Sharia law" and authorizes it
to be the main source of legislation instead of a main source of
legislation. 28 In calling for "the principles of Sharia law," the
Egyptian constitution eliminates the possibility of generally
recognizing Islamic ideals and narrows Islam to a much more
rigid, strict and applicable law. 129 Iraq, on the other hand, by
foregoing the word "principles" or any other qualifier before
"Islam," implicitly maintains the ability to generally recognize and
apply principles of Islam, instead of a strict, inflexible Islamic
law. 130
In the second element of Article 2, Egypt authorizes Islam
more authority than Iraq by calling it the main source of
legislation instead of a main source of legislation. 13 1 However,
despite Egypt's broad allocation of authority to Article 2, Egypt's
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) has effectively limited the
influence of Islam by making stringent requirements for its

that Islam applies generally to all provisions of the Iranian Constitution no
matter the interpretation).
126. On the more conservative side of granting Islamic Law influence in
legislation, Turkey, who prides itself on secularism, focuses more on the
secular state. See Niyazi Oktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REv. 371,
397 (2002) (noting Turkey's effort to separate church from state by
prohibiting religious symbols in the public school system).
127. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 86 (declaring that because of the
1980 reformation of Article 2, Islamic law has a more important role in
Egyptian society and is a potentially powerful clause).
128. See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] art. 2.
129. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 86-87 (recounting that when Article
2 was adopted in 1971 (as Islamic Sharia as a source of legislation), it was
not considered to require Egyptian laws to be rewritten to conform to the
Sharia). Id. However, the new version definitely gives the Sharia more
authority to influence Egyptian legislation. Id.
130. See Silt, supra note 5, at 741 (noting that the Iraqi Interim
Constitution tracked the same language, but without a qualifier). Thus,
Article 2 could literally signify that any aspect of Islam could be a source of
legislation. Id.
131. Iraq's current rendition of Article 2 is the same as the Egyptian
Constitution of 1971. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 85 ("Article 2 also
contained a clause that stated ... 'Islamic Sharia is a principal source of
Egyptian legislation.").
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application. 13 2 Thus, in practice, Islam is not "the" main source of
legislation, but plays a more limited role in Egypt's
jurisprudence.1

33

In sum, Iraq's Article 2 pales in comparison to Iran's
domineering, all-authoritative Article 4.134 With respect to Article
2

in

the

Egyptian

constitution,

Iraq's

Article

2,

notably

constructed in the same manner as Egypt's, is seemingly weaker
because it only calls for the application of "Islam" generally,
instead of a specific Islamic law. 135 Moreover, Iraq further dilutes
Egypt's Article 2 by promulgating Islam as a main source of law
instead of the main source of law. 136 Thus, Iraq finds itself taking
a more conservative approach in its allocation of authority to
Islam than both Egypt and Iran. 137 Although Iraq has the most
conservative approach, it still could enable the effectuation of a
38
dominant Islamic law.1

132. See Silt, supra note 5, at 727 (explaining that the SCC has rarely
invalidated legislation for contradicting Article 2 because of the specificity
and narrowness of the two part test).
133. See id. at 727-28 (stating that because there exist numerous
interpretations of the Koran, in practice experts have difficulty agreeing on
one interpretation).
134. See The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq art 2; see Qanuni
Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] 1358 [1980] art 4. However, even though Iraq's Article 2 is weaker than
Iran's Article 4, Article 2 could still lead to a repressive state. Compare Silt,
supra note 5, at 719 (stating that Iraqis would not be sympathetic to Iran's
system of government because of Iraq's diverse population and knowledge of
Iranian's dissatisfaction with their government), with Rohde, supra note 8, at
4.4 (arguing that the constitution in its current form could possibly lead to an
oppressive state).
135. See The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq art 2; Dustur
Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab Republic of Egypt]
art. 2.
136. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 2 §1.
137. For the purposes of this Comment, a more conservative approach to
Islam is allowing civil law to rule over Islamic law. A more liberal approach
is just the opposite, granting Islamic law power over civil law.
138. Just as occurs in Egypt and Iran, the Supreme Federal Court of Iraq
will ultimately decide Article 2's sphere of influence. See infra notes 156-80
and accompanying text (claiming that the Supreme Federal Court of Iraq
plays a vital role in the interpretation of Article 2).
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C. Article 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) Protect both Islam and Democracy,
but Set Forth a Vague Standard,Leaving the Possibilityof an
Iranian-StyleIslamic Theocracy.
Through Article 2(1)(a) and Article 2(1)(b), both protectionist
clauses, Iraq distances itself from Egypt's approach to Islam and
leaves open the possibility of an Islamic theocracy comparable to
Iran.139 Article 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) respectively require that no law
may contradict Islam and that no law may contradict
democracy.14 0 Since the constitution neglects to specifically define
Islam and democracy, it is difficult to predict how they will
balance each other. 14 1 Democracy could signify that democratic
principles will generally apply to all legislation, or it could set
forth explicit inalienable rights and freedoms to which all
legislation must conform. 14 2 As discussed previously, Islam could
have a spectrum of varying interpretations. 4 3 Proponents of an
Islamic theocracy will definitely vocalize their support of Article
2(1)(a), while there is question as to whether there is a competent,
44
democratic voice to support Article 2(1)(b) in Iraq. 1
The Iranian constitution parallels the Iraqi Constitution with
its two significant protectionist clauses, one protecting Islam and
the other democratic principles. 145 Article 4 in the Iranian
139. See Burns, supra note 41 ("Shiite religious parties may use their
majority in the assembly to ... reject Iraq's strong secular tradition in modern
times in favor of a stringently Islamic state.").
140. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 2; see Feldman,
supra note 2 (recognizing that the Shiites, Sunni and Kurds in drafting the
constitution deferred many tricky questions for debate by future legislators
and judges).
141. See Glanz, supra 25 (voicing that the constitution is extremely
general, but that this general language could "still be molded by legislation
and precedent into a subtle intermingling" of both principles of democracy
and Islam).
142. See Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure, supra note 27, at 54
(recommending that Iraq promulgate a bill of rights in order to establish
mechanisms that protect democracy).
143. See supra Part II.B (stating that Islam could signify a specific Islamic
law or the general principles of Islam).
144. Whether these two articles are interpreted broadly or narrowly could
significantly change the face of Islam in Iraq. See, e.g., Filkins & Glanz,
supra note 5, at A8 (observing that the Shiites have no qualms in creating an
Islamic theocracy).
145. See JURIST, Iran, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/iran.htm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2006) (stating that Article 4 directly contradicts Article 6 in the
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constitution states that Islamic principles apply absolutely and
generally to all articles of the Constitution, thus providing a
concrete foundation for Islam. 146
Article 6 in the Iranian
Constitution protects democracy in providing that elections and
14 7
public opinion will govern the administration of affairs.
However, even though Article 6 provides a basis for democratic
principles, in practice Article 4 assumes a significant portion of
power and authority in Iran. 148 Therefore, although Iraq does not
permit Islam the same dominating presence as Iran in other
sections of the Constitution, an expansive, broad interpretation of
Iraq's Article 2 could allocate Islam as much authority as Iran's
Article 4.149
The Egyptian constitution is distinguishable from Iraq's
because it does not contain an article specifically protecting
Islam. 150 The constitution generally protects religion in Article
46, which "guarantees the freedom of belief and the freedom of
practice of religious rights," but lacks any specific information on
15 1
particular religious denominations.
In terms of democratic protection, the Egyptian Constitution
declares Egypt a democratic state where the people are the source
of authority and enumerates
numerous freedoms
for

constitution because the rights granted in Article 6 are unreasonably
restricted by Article 4) [hereinafter JURIST, Iran].
146. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran- [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art 4; compare The Constitution of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia art. 23 & 48 (stating in Article 23 that "the state
protects the Islamic creed, carries out its Sharia" and in Article 48 that "the
Sharia rules ...
that ...
do not contradict the Holy Quran and Sunnah"), with
Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] 1358 [1980] art 4.
147. JURIST, Iran, supra note 145.
148. See id. (noting that "[t]he rights granted to the people in Article 6 are
unreasonably restricted by the Article 4's mandate that no law or regulation
may contradict Islamic principles").
149. See id. (commenting on the inability of Iranian citizens to change
their government due to numerous restrictions).
150. See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt].
151. Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt] art. 46; compare Kuwait Const. art. 12 (specifically
isolating Islam by stating it "safeguard[s] the heritage of Islam"), with
Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab Republic of
Egypt] art. 46.
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individuals. 152 Thus, Egypt heavily protects democratic principles
and does little more than Article 2 to protect Islam.1 53 In sum, the
Iraqi Constitution, by virtue of an additional protective Islamic
provision (Article 2(1)(b)), goes beyond the Egyptian Constitution
in protecting Islam, and even advances toward Iran's theocratic
approach of Islamic exaltation. 154 However, a well-established,
competent democratic voice could limit Article 2(1)(b)'s scope of
55
influence. 1
D. The Requirement of Expert Judges on the Supreme Federal
Court and Authorizing PersonalStatus Courts Could Undermine
DemocraticPrinciples.
Since the Supreme Federal Court of Iraq will ultimately
interpret the articles of the new Iraqi constitution, the makeup
and structure of the court system will significantly impact the face
56
of Islam in Iraq. 1
1. The Supreme FederalCourt
The Iraqi constitution under Article 89(2) requires the
Supreme Federal Court to include a number of judges who are
expert in Islamic jurisprudence. 157 This requirement gives rise to
questions such as what is an expert in Islamic jurisprudence and
how many of the judges will be Islamic experts. 158
The
interpretation of these judicial factors will determine how Islam
59
influences Iraqi jurisprudence. 1
152. See Egypt, supra note 77 (indicating that the Egyptian constitution
provides for a strong executive).
153. See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt].
154. See Preeta D. Bansal & Nina Shea, Iraq Must Avoid a Rollback of
Rights, WASH. POST., Aug. 4, 2005, at A23 (admitting that this additional
article could place Iraq along side Iran and Saudi Arabia).
155. This caveat is not implying that a Western Democracy would be the
ideal system for Iraq, but simply that democratic principles must be
established in Iraq.
156. See discussion infra Parts II.D.I & II (exploring the nature of Iraq's
Supreme Federal Court and personal status courts).
157. The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 89.2.
158. See, e.g., Filkins & Glanz, supra note 5, at A8 (stating that the Shiite
leaders tried to insert a provision that would declare senior Shiite clerics
independent of the government and symbols of the nation).
159. Id.
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An expert in Islamic jurisprudence could be interpreted to
signify a holy cleric (a religious leader) or an expert schooled in
Islamic law. 160 If religious clerics are chosen as judges, they will
regard the Koran as governing law and will invalidate any
16 1
legislation that fails to conform to the principles of the Koran.
Moreover, God's law would prevail over civil law in all
circumstances, connoting an Islamic theocracy. 162 However, if the

judges on the Supreme Federal Court are experts in Islamic
Jurisprudence, they would have a profound knowledge of Islamic
law and regard it as one of many sources of jurisprudence.163 The

effect would be a respect of Islamic heritage and traditions
without allowing Islam to be the ultimate authority in every
64

case. 1

Like the definition of Islamic experts, the number of judges
required to be experts in Islamic jurisprudence will also affect the
influence of Islam. 16 5 The more judges required to have expertise
in Islam, even if only secular or academic knowledge, the greater
the possibility that the court's jurisprudence will favor Islamic
66

law. 1

Iraqi's Supreme Federal Court is similar to Iran's Council of
Guardians because Iran's Constitution also requires that judges
The Iranian Constitution
be experts in Islamic law.167
160. See Burns, supra note 41, (arguing that the majority of Shiites,
especially those chairing the parliamentary constitutional committee, are
pushing for an Islamic theocracy). But see Brown, supra note 32, at 11
(arguing that it is unlikely that any senior Shiite clerics would serve on the
constitutional court because it is beneath their dignity).
161. See The Law of Man or the Law of God?, supra note 74, at 10 (stating
that Islam has a set of God-given laws that are not open to revision by other
laws).
162. See id. at 11 (arguing that Islam does not prescribe any system of
governance and that democracy is too far of a stretch).
163. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 93 (describing the Egyptian SCC as
having judges that are schooled in Islamic jurisprudence). However, the
question for Egypt is how much schooling is required and not if the judges
will be clerics as in Iraq. See id.
164. See Yakub, supra note 9, at 299 (concluding that Islam embraces
many of the tenets of democracy, such as liberating people from political
oppression and creating social equality).
165. See Filkins, supra note 8 (stating that the question of whether to
allow clerics to sit upon the Supreme Court is still unresolved).
166. Id.
167. See Mozafarian, supra note 29, at 289 (indicating that the Iranian
constitution grants the Guardian Council excessive discretionary power).
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promulgates a Guardian Council consisting of six religious men,
selected by the head of judicial power, and six jurists. 68 In
practice, both the jurists and the religious men are in fact holy
clerics. 169 If Iraq authorizes a substantial number of holy clerics
on the Supreme Federal Court as does Iran, there is a strong
70
likelihood of the development of an Islamic theocratic state.
Although Iran and Iraq each have a requirement for Islamic
experts, Iraq's Supreme Federal Court and Iran's Council of
Guardians greatly differ in authority. 17 1 The Guardian Council,
under Article 98, has the power to supervise the elections of the
President of the Republic and the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Iranian Legislature). 172 The Guardian Council is also a direct
recourse to popular opinion and referenda. 173
Thus, it may
exclude candidates for the Islamic Consultative Assembly based
on ideological, political and religious suitability. 174 Conversely,
the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court lacks the authority to supervise
the election of candidates for the Council of Representatives (Iraqi
75
Legislature). 1
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt is also

168. See SCHRAZI, supra note 62, at 11 (noting that the six jurists have the
right to vote on whether parliamentary resolutions are in conformity with the
Sharia); Mozafarian, supra note 29, at 289 (suggesting that because of the
broad discretion of the Guardian Council, they are able to go beyond the
interpretation of the proper Sharia in determining relevant Islamic law).
169. See SCHIRAZI, supra note 62, at 8 (commenting that the Islamic
elements of the Iranian constitution ensure that positions of leadership will
be reserved for Islamic jurists).
170. See discussion supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (explaining
that the more religious clerics (or even those schooled in Islam), the more the
Iraqi Supreme Federal Court will resemble Iran's Council of Guardians).
171. See id. ("The second most important government institution is the
Guardian Council which has the right to veto over parliamentary
resolution.").
172. See id. at 13 (noting that in practice the Guardian Council occupies a
dominant position in the legislature).
173. See id. at 14 (stating that a function of the guardian council is to
interpret the constitution, and supervise elections).
174. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, U.S. Dep't of State,
Iran, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41721.htm (2005) (last visited
Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Iran Human Rights] (indicating that the
Guardian Council only accepts candidates who support a theocratic state).
175. See The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 90 (limiting
the power of the Supreme Federal Court to only ratifying the results of the
election).
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distinguished from Iraq's because Egypt's constitution contains no
requirement for Islamic experts. 176 In practice, the judges on the
SCC are experts in Islamic law, but not necessarily clerics. 17 7 On
the other hand, Iraq and Egypt are similar in that each grants its
constitutional courts the power of judicial review. 178 Iraq permits
the court to review the constitutionality of legislation and
likewise, the Egyptian SCC may screen the constitutionality of all
laws and regulations. 179 Thus, Iraq's judiciary is set up to balance
both democracy and Islam, as long as judges do not subordinate
Iraqi law to their personal religious beliefs.' 80
2. PersonalStatus Courts

The Iraqi constitution promulgates two principle clauses with
respect to personal status courts.18 1 While Article 39 states that
Iraqis are free in their commitment in personal status cases
according to their religion, Article 92 prohibits special or
182
exceptional courts as regulated by law.
Article 39 clearly authorizes personal status issues to be
governed by one's religion, but does not call specifically for or
prohibit personal status courts. 183 Thus, Article 92 could be
interpreted as prohibiting solely military courts and other similar

176.

See supra Part I.C.4 (describing the constitutional requirements for

the SCC).
177. See Lombardi, supra note 80, at 115 (recounting that the SCC allows
civil judges and that the SCC also assumes that they can define the Sharia
law). However, many Islamists insist that only professional Islamic scholars
can properly identify and apply the principles of the Sharia. Id.
178. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD
150 (2002) (identifying the Egyptian SCC as a potential strong actor in the
struggle to establish constitutionalism and democracy in Egypt).
179. Id. at 149 (noting that Egypt's SCC has invalidated some restrictions
on political parties and nongovernmental organizations and thrice struck
down electoral laws).
180. See supra Part I.A.4 (analyzing Iraq's judiciary, where there is
notably no requirement for a certain number of judges or certain
requirements of credentials for judges).
181. See The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq. art. 39 & 92.
182. Id. See Brown, supra note 32, at 11 (stating this provision precludes
exceptional courts and prevents trial of civilians in military courts).
183. See Reed, supra note 21, at 509 (calling attention to the negative
effects of religious courts, such as inequalities arising within particular
religious communities because of the burden forced upon a non-Muslim's
trying to employ the services of Muslim court).
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specialty courts, or could include personal status courts.18 4
However, Article 92 contains a potentially controlling precondition that it shall be "regulated by law."' 185 Consequently, if
Islamic law becomes the law of Iraq, religious courts applying
Islamic law will more than likely exist.18 6 However, if civil law
governs Iraq, Article 92 will probably be interpreted as prohibiting
religious courts and all cases will be adjudicated in civil courts by
87
civil judges.
To be distinguished, the Egyptian Constitution is silent in
regard to courts of personal status. 188 In practice, personal status
issues are dealt with by civil courts and Sharia law is only a
1 89
supplemental source of law in limited circumstances.
The Iranian Constitution also contrasts that of Iraq because
through Articles 2 and 4, it gives Islam unbridled authority over
Iran's jurisprudence. 190 Therefore, in theory and practice, all
courts in Iran are religious.191
In sum, Iraq situates itself relatively close to the Egyptian
approach with a constitutional court capable of reviewing
legislation and personal status courts. 192 However, there is still a
wide range of possible interpretations, which could lead to Islamic
193
clerics serving as judges and personal status courts.

184. See id. at 497 (indicating that the establishment of personal status
courts generally causes religious coercion that infringes upon individual
rights).
185. See, e.g., SCHIRAZI, supra note 62, at 11 (noting that Iran has similar
phrases in its constitution which naturally imply Islamic law).
186. Id.
187. See generally MARK HOYLE, MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT (1991)
(explaining the origin of both personal status and civil courts in Egypt and
their evolution).
188. See Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr Al-'Arabiyya [The Const. of The Arab
Republic of Egypt].
189. Silt, supra note 5, at 732.
190. See Iran Human Rights, supra note 174 (stating that the Supreme
Leader of Iran, a Muslim clergyman, dominates the judicial branches of Iran,
as well as the executive and legislature).
191. See id.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80 (comparing and
contrasting the Egypt's SCC with Iraq's Supreme Federal Court).
193. See Feldman, supra note 2 (observing that many details of Iraqi
courts was left for the legislature to decide).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Iraqi Constitution Should Be InterpretedAccording to the
Spirit Set Forth in the Preamble.
The Iraqi preamble sets the tone and mood for the
constitution, similar to the Egyptian preamble. 194 It strikes a
delicate balance between Islam and democratic principles by, on
one hand, recognizing Islam as an integral part in the origin and
heritage of Iraq and on the other hand, establishing democratic
principles such as justice, freedom and equality. 195
In order to adequately preserve this balance of democratic
principles and Islam, the constitution should be interpreted within
the framework set forth by the preamble. 196 If the preamble is
fully incorporated into legislation, Islam will serve as the
foundation for values and principles in the constitution. 19 7 As well,
all Iraqis will have the freedom and protection of democratic
principles. 198 Therefore, it is important that these components of
the preamble underscore and permeate the articles of the
constitution. 199
B. In Order to Protect Democratic Principles,it is Important to
Strictly ConstrueArticle 2.
The preservation of Article 2 in its present form is important
to establishing democratic principles in Iraq. 200 If interpreted too
broadly, Iraq could evolve into an Islamic theocracy comparable to
Iran. 2 0 1 To prevent a theocracy and follow the intentions of the
194.

See supra Part I.A:2 (demonstrating the unique balance between

Islam and democracy established by the preamble of Iraq's constitution).
195. See Bali, supra note 12, at 449 ("[I]mportant rule-of-law
commitments and values are present in Arab legal traditions.").
196. See supra Part I.A.2 (indicating a strong ideological harmony
between notions of democracy and Islam, which was intended to persist
throughout the entire constitution).
197. See Bali, supra.note 12, at 450 (noting the importance of building on
the core values of the Iraqi society rather than trying to efface them).
198. See The Permanent Const. of The Republic of Iraq pmbl.
199. See generally C.A. HOOPER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF IRAQ (1998).
200. See Rohde, supra note 8, at 4.4 (explaining that declaring Islam the
principle inspiration for Iraq's laws could be dangerous).
201. If Article 2 were interpreted too broadly, this would go against the
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drafters, Article 2 should be interpreted literally as written in the
constitution. 2 02 Islam should be "a" source of law and not "the
principle" or "the fundamental" source of law. 203 Moreover, it is
important that "Islam" be interpreted generally as Islamic
principles and not specifically as Islamic law. 204 As Article 2 is
strictly and literally applied, as in Egypt,20 5 the possibility of

Islam suppressing or compromising democratic principles will be
2 06
much less probable.
C. In Order to Insure that Article 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) Are Equally
Balanced, it May Be Useful for Human Rights Law, International
Law and Non-Governmental Organizationsto Enumerate
Principlesof Democracy.
As Iraq evolves into a democracy, proponents of Islam will
insure that Islam is protected and incorporated into the new
government. 207 In fact, the Shiites have already demonstrated a
determination to establish Islam in Iraq. 208 However, the same
may not be true for democracy. Principles of democracy are a
intentions of the legislature. Burns,

supra note 41 (stating that the main

reason for the provision is to prevent an Islamic theocracy).
202. Id.
203. See supra Part II.B (exploring the possible interpretations of Article
2).
204. See Iraq's Constitution: Democracy or Division?, supra note 7
("Twenty-four of the forty-four predominantly Muslim countries world-wide
don't use Islamic law as their primary source of laws."); see Reed, supra note
22, at 486 ("For most Muslims, Islam is a religion that allows and requires
free speech, democratic participation, and tolerance.").
205. See supra Part I.C.2 (indicating that in practice the SCC limits the
application of the Sharia law to where (1) the authenticity of the text (Koran)
is proven and (2) there is one absolutely clear meaning of the text).
Obviously there are endless methods to limit the reach of Islamic law-Egypt
is only one example.
206. When this Comment recommends applying Islamic principles instead
of Islamic law, it means principles of Islamic law that change with society.
See Reed, supra note 21, at 512 (acknowledging that some experts say Islam
can change to accommodate the needs of the time, even if doctrine cannot).
"In the ancient world, practical applications changed with community needs."
Id.
207. See Iraq, supra note 3 (stating that the division of Religion is 60%65% Shiite Muslim, 32%-37% Sunni Muslim, 3% Christian and others less
than 1%, thus showing ample representation of the Muslim faith).
208. See Fassihi, supra note 21 (indicating that the Shiites have pushed
relentlessly for Islam to be the main source of law).
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more foreign concept to Iraq and its leaders. 2 09 Therefore, it may
be useful to look to other resources for an understanding of
democratic principles, such as non-governmental organizations,
human rights groups 2 10 and international law.2 1 1 These could be a
source of information and aid in codifying and establishing
democratic principles as a part of Iraq's law. 2 12 As a result,
democratic principles would be afforded an additional protection
and democracy would become a more integral part of Iraq's
2 13
Jurisprudence.
D. It is Important that Judges on Iraq's Supreme Federal Court Be
only Required to Have Secular Knowledge of Islam and that
Special Religious CourtsAre Prohibited.
The requirement of judges to be experts in Islamic
jurisprudence in Article 89(2) should be interpreted as those
having substantial knowledge in Islamic law and not as religious
clerics. 2 14 Religious clerics would most likely invalidate legislation
in order to follow the Koran as occurs in Iran. 2 15 Following the
209.

See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, U.S. Dep't of

State, Iraq: A Population Silenced, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/15996.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006) (explaining that voting and other democratic
rights have been far displaced from Iraq because of Saddam Hussein's
oppressive regime).
210. See generally Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need World's Collide: The Hudad
Crimes of Islamic Law and InternationalHuman Rights, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
43 (2000) (identifying the many sources of Human Rights Law; for example,
The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights).
211. See Cynthia Hamra, Karen Heyman, Anita Sarah Jackson, Laura
Martino, Incorporating Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Into
Peace Agreements and New Constitutions, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLICY GROUP (providing model language for the protection of specific human
rights generally found in constitutions), http://www.publicinternationallaw
.org/programs/peace/drafters/Human Rights Template.pdf.
212. See, e.g., Paul R. Williams & William Spencer, Editorial, Iraq's
Political Compact, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13 2005, at A15 ('To turn the
political compact into a workable constitution will require continued
development of these skills and the assistance of the United States and the
international community.").
213. See generally Farish A. Noor, NegotiatingIslamic Law, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sep. 19 2002, at 23 (arguing that Muslim governments are confronted
by hard-line Islamists who call for religious law when secular legal systems
fails). "Moreover, the corruption endemic in poorer countries takes a large
bite out of justice." Id.
214. See Brown, supranote 32, at 11.
215. See Mozafarian, supra note 29, at 289 (noting that the Guardian

2006]

THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION

Egyptian example and authorizing judges with expertise in Islam
2 16
would balance Islam with civil law.
In regard to courts of personal status, Article 92 should be
narrowly defined to exclude radical religious courts. 2 17 Personal
status courts may force individuals to accept religious beliefs with
which they do not agree. 2 18 Moreover, personal status courts have
a potential to discriminate against women and violate human
rights. 219 Islamic law could find a place within the civil code in
limited circumstances, but must not be a justification for human
22 0
rights violations.
CONCLUSION

The Iraqi constitution is a living document formulated by the
Iraqis themselves through democratic methods. Iraq has a unique
approach in showing devotion and reverence for Islamic traditions
22 1
while embracing the freedoms and rights insured by democracy.

power has ultimate subjugation of all state activity, giving it tremendous
power).
216. Along with only requiring judges with Islamic expertise, the judicial
system must be fair and effective in order to instill confidence among Iraqis.
See id. at 452.
217. See Talal Asad, Boundaries and Rights in Islamic Law: Introduction,
Soc. RES., Sept. 19, 2002, at 683, 684 (2003) (contending that supervisory
institutions in modern Islamic countries have become much more intrusive in
everyday life than classical jurisprudence allowed). Prohibiting religious
courts must not be mistaken as prohibiting religion or Islam. It simply means
there will be no special courts for Islam or any other religion. Id.
218. Reed, supra note 21, at 497.
219. Fassihi, supra note 21 ("Shiites want the civil family law changed to
the strict Sharia law, which would compromise the rights to women with
respect to marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody."). See Reed,
supra note 22 (pointing out that "the European Court of Human Rights
suggests that a system in which Islamic religious courts adjudicate personal
issues could never be consist with democracy or the protection of basic human
rights").
220. This is provided that the civil courts are reliable and consistent. In
many developing countries, going to the civil system means having to pay for
lawyers and wait for a long period of time. Noor, supra note 215, at 23. See
also Mayer, supra note 11 (according to many modern Muslims, principles of
Islam do not require forfeiting human rights).
221. See Charles Krauthammer, A Sensible Iraqi Constitution, WASH.
POST., Sept. 2, 2005, at A29 (arguing that although not perfect, the Iraqi
constitution deserves far more respect than it has received by critics). "The
idea that it creates an Islamic theocracy is simply false. Its Islamist influence
is relatively mild." Id. But See Andrew C. McCarthy, A Not So Sensible Iraqi
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As the people of Iraq respect the balance between Islam and
democracy already set forth in the constitution, they will build a
faithful and free society.
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